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Introduction 
The  bulk of s t r i k e  r e s e a r c h  has used quantitative methodologies, largely as a 
result of t he  ready availability of government da t a  co l lec ted  fo r  ove r  one  hundred 
years. Even a cursory reading of the l i terature reveals a concern with numbers from 
as early as the  turn of the century. Yet, t o  date ,  no sys temat ic  a t t e m p t  has  been  
made t o  evaluate the  empirical basis of this rapidly growing body of literature. 
The cent ra l  purpose of this paper is t o  assess both the  reliability of ava i l ab l e  
o f f i c i a l  s t r i k e  ma te r i a l ,  and t h e  methodologica l  adequacy  of quantitative strike 
analysis. The focus i s  on t h e  ways d a t a  and methodologica l  problems may h a v e  
a f fec ted  theoretically relevant conclusions. All too of ten, sound theories a r e  rejected 
and bad ones put forward on the  basis of poor empir ica l  work, e i t h e r  in  t e r m s  of  
un re l i ab l e  d a t a  or  .methodological  p i t fa l l s .  More broadly, the  paper also critically 
evaluates a set of relevant references, highlights the  central issues and  problems in 
t h e  f ie ld ,  o f f e r s  some  sugges t ions  on how t o  o v e r c o m e  existing discrepancies in 
findings, and explores lines for future research. It draws especially on my experience 
i n  ana lyz ing  Italian strikes since 1945, but also ranges widely across other countries 
and times. 
The f i rs t  three sections of the paper (sections 2 through 4) appraise the quality 
of official data  on which most empirical works a r e  based. Sec t ions  5 and  6 su rvey  
t h e  major  f indings and  the methodological weaknesses and strengths of 'quantitative 
s t r ' i k e  r e s e a r c h ,  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  o n  t h e  s t u d y  o f  b o t h  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
political/organizational d e t e r m i n a n t s  of s t r ikes .  The  lack  of integration and the 
d i sc repanc ie s  in empi r i ca l  f indings b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  l ines  of inquiry wil l  b e  
add res sed  in s ec t ion  7. In section 8 a n  a t t empt  is made at clearly spelling out  the 
limitations of the  quantitative approach  t o  t h e  s tudy  of s t r i k e s  and  a t  exploring 
p r o f i t a b l e  alternatives. The conclusions bring together the focal points of the paper, 
highlighting unexplored lines of research. 
Franzosi, Quantitative Strike Research: 1 
About Strikes and Strike Statistics 
To say that  strikes a r e  as old as work itself is t o  repeat the first  line of many 
s tud ie s  of  s t r ikes .  The  withholding of labor  is known t o  have  o c c u r r e d  during 
a n t i q u i t y ,  t h e  Middle Ages and  t h e  Rena i s sance  ( see  Crouzel, 1887). I t  was not, 
however, until the  emergence of wage labor under industrial capi tal ism t h a t  s t r i k e s  
became a routine expression of workers' claims. "Out of t he  incessant struggles among 
claimants, objects of their claims, and intervening authorities grew a series of half- 
s ta ted and compelling definitions and rules": t he  forms of work stoppages tha t  would 
be  acceptable, the actions allowed during a strike, the  kind of demands t h a t  would be 
appropriate, where and when police would s tep  in, and so on (see Tilly, 1981:5). 
Sometime during the  last century-around 1830 in England, toward the  middle of 
t h e  c e n t u r y  in  F r a n c e  and later yet in Germany and Italy--strikes came  into being 
together with a distinctive new repertoire of collective action, largely brought about 
by t h e  fo rma t ion  of na t iona l  states a n d  "na t iona l iza t ion  of power and politics". 
Demonstrations, electoral rallies, public mee t ings ,  etc. gradual ly c a m e  t o  r ep l ace  
r o u t i n e s .  t h a t  had been familiar to  the Western World for centuries: food riots, tax 
rebellions, collective 'invasions of enclosed lands, and so on (for an introduction t o  t he  
c h a n g e s  in  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  action during the nineteenth century see Tilly, 
1981). 
Another  half a century; though, was t o  go  by before systematic collecting and 
publishing of s t r i k e  d a t a  would begin. In m o s t  wes t e rn  coun t r i e s  t h i s  occu r red  
sometime between 1870 and 1900. Until then, strikes were mainly a matter  of police 
recording (see Perrot, 1974). They were viewed, in fact ,  as crimes under Combination 
Acts. Data were kept secret  in the hands of Ministries of the Interior. 
Only when the  conception of strikes shifted from one of cr ime t o  one of 'social 
illness', did s t r i k e s  become  the concern of specialized Labor Ministries. I t  is these 
Ministries tha t  initiated systematic recording and publishing of s t r i k e  d a t a  and t h a t  
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s t anda rd ized  def in i t ions  and  co l l ec t ing  procedures  (see Perrot,  1974). These early 
statistics were very rich in information on t h e  i m m e d i a t e  c a u s e s  of s t r i kes ,  t h e i r  
ou tcomes ,  t h e i r  o rgan iza t iona l  bases ,  the occurrences of violent incidents and the 
number of establishments affected by any given strike. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  t i m e s  when o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  published such de t a i l ed  
information for each individual strike a r e  lomg gone. The figures currently published 
in most western countries a r e  highly aggregated (on data  availability across countries, 
see Fisher, 1973). 
The  purpose of t h i s  s e c t i o n  is t o  assess the reliability of official strike data  
and, in particular, of the  three  measures most commonly used t o  quan t i fy  s t r ikes :  
number  of s t r i kes ,  number  of  workers  involved and number of hours lost (on the 
general issue, see Shalev, 1978). 
The  f i r s t  p roblem conce rns  t h e  o f f i c i a l  def in i t ion  of a s t r ike .  What most 
quantitative researchers s tudy ,  in  f a c t ,  is  w h a t  t hey  f ind  in  na t iona l  s t a t i s t i c a l  
yearbooks. The way a strike is defined by the data  collecting agencies does make a 
difference. For instance, in Italy, until 1954, a strike according t o  ISTAT (the Italian 
Central Statistical Office) was any labor dispute--strike or lockout--between employers 
and employees tha t  would lead t o  an  interruption of normal working activities of at 
least one working day of duration, or, if less, for several consecutive days. Starting 
in 1955, labor conflicts include all  work s toppages  of any  dura t ion ,  even  of s o m e  
f r a c t i o n  of a n  hour. In both periods, all conflicts tha t  originate for reasons tha t  go 
beyond the s t r ic t  employer-employee relation, such a s  demonstrative strikes connected 
wi th  measures  of pol i t ical  economy, with national or international events, etc., a re  
not recorded (af ter  1975 these types of strikes have been recorded separately). 
Considering t h a t  mos t  I t a l i an  s t r i k e s  are of a s h o r t  duration, official data  
probably underestimated s t r ike  f r equency  in t h e  y e a r s  i m m e d i a t e l y  following t h e  
Second World War. Fu r the rmore ,  un t i l  1975, s t r i k e  size and  volume a r e  biased 
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downward. Demonstrative strikes, in fact,  usually a re  national, inter-industry strikes 
that  involve, for however short a time, millions of workers throughout t h e  country.  
The exclusion of this type of strike cannot but bias the number of strikers and hours 
lost indicators, and the others derived from them: s i ze ,  volume and duration. The 
extent of the bias depends upon the frequency and average duration of disputes. 
What is more important is that such biases in the  data can distort relationships 
.among variables. For ins tance ,  la rge  scale, inter-industry strikes clearly require a 
higher degree of workers' organizational capacity than do small, shop-level disputes. 
The loss of  information about the large-scale, 'political', demonstrative strikes, may 
be telling when assessing the  impact  of unions' organiza t ional  capaci ty  on s t r ike  
a c t i v i t y  (see  Stearns ,  1974:lO). By the same token, one could say very lit t le about 
unions' ability t o  influence,  by the i r  act ion,  nat ional ,  cen t ra l - s t a t e  poli t ics  (1). 
Definitions do make a difference, and therefore more attention should be paid to the 
problem than is normally done in the literature (2). 
Second, t h e r e  a r e  t h e  problems involved in the data collecting procedures. To 
continue with the  Italian example, although the  Central Statistical Office (ISTAT) is  
char'ged with 'data collection, the actual work is  carried out  by local police offices 
(questura). They will record a s t r ike  only if they  come  t o  know about  i t ,  e i t h e r  
d i rec t ly  f rom t h e  employer or t h e  unions, o r  indirectly through their information 
network. Under this data collecting procedure the  number of strikers and hours los t  
a re  likely to  be quite distorted. 
Guessing the magnitude or the direction (upward or downward) of the bias is not 
an easy matter. If employers report the strike, they may be more inclined, from time 
t o  t ime ,  t o  play down t h e  s t r ike  t o  embarrass  the unions or to portray a public 
image of peaceful labor relations, they may also magnify i t  in order to  justify future 
r e t a l i a to ry  ac t ions  and/or police or government intervention. Union reported figures 
are more likely to  be overestimated for obvious reasons. If police offices themselves 
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estimate the size of the strike it  may be no more than pure guess-work (3) (4). 
St r ike  f r e q u e n c y ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  is, l i k e l y  t o  b e  a l w a y s  g r e a t l y  
underes t imated  since small,  short ,  shop-level spontaneous work stoppages, that  
represent the  bulk of all strike occurences, probably escape recording, as scores  of 
f i e ld  invest igat ions have shown (see Turner, Clack and Roberts, 1967; Korpi, 1978, 
1981; Batstone et al., 1978) (5). But it  is precisely this type of s t r ike ,  r a the r  t h a n  
large and. centrally directed displays of union strength, that  provides a good indication 
of the  existence of diffused, grass-root discontent--often d i rec ted  against  o f f i c i a l  
unions a s  much as against employers. 
Finally, postwar official statistics, a s  we have seen, a re  highly aggregated. As a 
consequence, there is no way of telling, for instanc'e, which combination of s t r ike  
f requency and duration produced any given figure of number of hours lost (Batstone 
et al., 1978:23). Furthermore, official statistics do not  t e l l  us how many d i f f e r e n t  
workers went on strike in any given year. As Batstone et al. argue, a yearly total of 
100,000 could refer t o  100,000 different workers  or  t o  t h e  s a m e  10,000 going on 
strike 10 different times (Batstone et al., 1978:21; see also Knowles, 1968:502). 
Although it is always possible t o  get the average worker involvement per strike, 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  average  is among strikes very different in size may blur things 
even further. At the very minimum, it prevents any serious assessment of the impact 
of different organizational forms on strike activity. The type of organization required 
by a large, nation-wide and economy-wide strike must be very different from the one 
required by a small, shop-level strike. 
Fur the r  problems arise when what a re  essentially single strikes across a city or 
an industry get  recorded separately (6). The number of s t r ikes  is inflated but  t h e  
average strike size is reduced. Again, this would misrepresent the  organizational basis 
of strikes'(Batst0ne et al., 1978:22). As Stearns clearly points out: "The large strike 
t h a t  does no t  exceed the bounds of a single company probably does not reflect the 
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s a m e  level  o f  c lass  or group consciousness a s  a smaller strike that  spread more 
widely, a t  least before World War I" (Stearns, 1974:ll). 
No less significant may be the loss of information involved in spatial aggregation. 
And this is so not simply because official geographical aggregation may have more t o  
do  with bureaucra t i c  jurisdictions and local governments, than with culturally and 
historically homogeneous populations. Historical geography has, in fact, shown that  the 
s p a t i a l  spreading of various forms of p r o t e s t  movements  follows traceable and 
predictable patterns. W e  may 'not be able t o  map over space and time the diffusion 
of strikes--in particular during strike waves--when data a re  too highly aggregated (see 
Abler, Adams and Gould, 1971; for an example, see Charlesworth, 1979) (7). 
About Strike Indicators and Their Graphical Representations 
On t h e  basis of t h e  t h r e e  indica tors  co l l ec ted  and r e p o r t e d  by o f f i c i a l  
government  s tat is t ics--number of s t r ikes  (S), number of workers involved , (W) and 
number of hours lost (H)-several different measures have  been cons t ruc ted  in t h e  
literature: 
Frequency or number of strikes per thousand employed workers 
Size - or average number of strikers per strike (W/S) 
Duration or average number of hours lost per striker (H/W) 
Volume defined as  frequency x size x duration 
= (S/Thousand employed workers) x (W/S) x (H/W) 
= (H/Thousand employed workers) 
( for  these  definitions, see Forcheimer, 1948; Knowles, 1952; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; 
Hibbs, 1976). 
The following graphica l  representa t ions  have  been proposed for  the  above 
measures: the two4imensiona1, rectangular s t r ike  'profiles '  suggested by Spielmans 
(1944); t h e  t i m e  plots  proposed by Knowles (19521, where each component of the 
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additive expression obtained by taking the log of the volume of strikes is plotted in 
the same graph; and Shorter and  Tilly's three-dimensional  'shape' of s t r ikes  (see  
Shor ter  and Tilly, 1971, 1974; s e e  also B r i t t  and Galle, 1974; Hibbs, 1976). In a 
three-dimensional space, the shape of strikes refers to  t h e  rec tangular  solid whose 
s ides  a r e  given by t h e  size,  durat ion,  and frequency of strikes and whose volume 
corresponds, of course, to the volume of strikes previously defined (8). 
Fig. 1 - Strike Shapes 
Duration 
Shape a) Shape b) 
Size 
Frequency 
The most interesting finding about the shape of strikes is the dramatic change 
i t  has undergone over t h e  l a s t  one hundred years. The expansion of industr ial  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s ,  in t e r m s  of both number and size,  and t h e  growth of.  labor 
organizations, have led to  a long-run increase in strike frequency and size (9). This 
upward trend has not been abated even by the coming of 'mature prosperity'. In fact,  
Franzosi, Quantitative Strike Research: 7 
t h e  1960s  waves  of i ndus t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  across  the  Western world largely disproved 
theses on t h e  "withering away of strikes'' in advanced capitalist s o c i e t i e s  ( s ee  Ross  
a n d  H a r t m a n ,  1960) (10). Only strike duration has been declining, underscoring the  
characteristic of strikes as a limited form of warfare, where neither party throws all 
power  r e s o u r c e s  i n to  t h e  b a t t l e  un t i l  the  opponent succumbs (see Batstone et al., 
1978). 
But shapes a) and b) in Fig. 1 do not only capture temporal differences. There 
is in f a c t  considerable cross-country variation tha t  can be approximated by shapes a )  
and b). For instance, even modern American and Canadian strike shapes more nearly 
resemble shape a). What makes a country's or a period's strike pattern so distinct is 
the  particular combination of these three strike dimensions, as one finds in the shape 
of strikes, rather than the  volume which can mask such  marked  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  its 
constituent components. In light of this finding, works tha t  purportedly explain inter- 
temporal and inter-national differences in industrial conflict on t h e  bas is  of vo lume 
alone appear t o  have l i t t le  justification (11). 
Another  problem wi th  s t anda rd ized  ind ica to r s  is t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  d e f l a t i n g  
p rocedures  have  been used-- total  civilian labor force, non-agricultural labor force, 
unionized labor  f o r c e ,  employmen t  f i gu res ,  e t c . - - l e a d i n g  t o  a n  u n n e c e s s a r y  
p ro l i f e r a t ion  of s t r ike  indicators t ha t  stand in the  way of comparability of findings 
(see Stern, 1978). Furthermore, standardized measures, such a s  volume,  where  labor  
f o r c e  f i g u r e s  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  denominator ,  have  been used in  t h e  c o n t e x t  of 
multivariate regression analysis as 'dependent' variables. The  a p p e a r a n c e  among t h e  
regressors of unemployment rate,  which also contains by definition labor force figures 
in the  denominator, builds into the  model artificial  correlations b e t w e e n  'dependent '  
and 'independent' variables (see Stern, 1978). 
It is in the  long run (or across countries) tha t  deflating procedures  have  mos t  
appeal, since they can account for structural changes (or differences) in the size and 
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compos i t i on  of t h e  labor  f o r c e  ( see  Douglas,  1923:869). Clear ly ,  there is a big 
difference between one million strikers in a to ta l  labor force of five million, or t he  
s a m e  o n e  million workers'on strike in a labor force of twenty million. In the short 
run, deflating is not only unwarranted by the  lack of major structural changes, but i t  
is also inappropriate. In fact,  one of the aims of econometric models is t o  est imate 
labor market  e f fec ts  on strike activity. Deflating procedures may actually defeat  this 
purpose,  g iven  that part  of the e f f ec t  of unemployment on strikes would have been 
'taken out' through the employment d e f l a t o r  (when employmen t  r a t h e r  t h a n  labor  
force '  figures a r e  used). 
r 
Even in t h e  long run, however ,  d e f l a t i n g  p rocedures  may no t  be the most 
appropriate way t o  cope with varying sizes of "population at risk". In fact ,  if long-run 
l abo r  f o r c e  movemen t s  a r e  bel ieved t o  b e  significant factors behind the  trend of 
strikes, then why not explicitly include them among the  regressors, just like any other 
s t r i k e  d e t e r m i n a n t ,  i n s t ead  of using deflating procedures? (see Stern, 1978; for an 
example of t he  use of 'such deflating procedures, see Hibbs, 1976). 
S e c o n d ,  ' a v e r a g e '  m e a s u r e s ,  such  as s i ze  and dura t ion ,  may mask wide 
differences in the  distribution of actual  strike sizes and durations, in particular when 
used fo r  i n t e rna t iona l  comparisons.  The same 'average' size, in fact ,  could be the  
result of a few, large and official strikes for the  renewal of industry-wide, collective 
I t  is in t h e  long run (or across countries) t ha t  deflating procedures have most 
appeal, since they can account for structural changes (or differences) in the  size and 
composi t ion  of t h e  labor  f o r c e  ( see  Douglas,  1923:869). Clear ly ,  there is a big 
difference between one million strikers in a to ta l  labor force of five million, or t h e  
s a m e  o n e  million workers on strike in a labor force of twenty million. In the short 
run, deflating is not only unwarranted by the  lack of major structural changes, but it 
is also inappropriate. In fact,  one of the aims of econometric models is t o  est imate 
labor market e f fec ts  on strike activity. Deflating procedures may actually defeat  this 
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purpose,  given that par t  of the e f f ec t  of unemployment on strikes would have been 
'taken out' through the  employment d e f l a t o r  (when employmen t  r a t h e r  t h a n  labor  
force figures a re  used). 
Even in t h e  long run,  however ,  d e f l a t i n g  procedures  may no t  be the most 
appropriate way t o  cope with varying sizes of "population at risk". In fact, if long-run 
l abo r  f o r c e  movemen t s  a r e  bel ieved t o  b e  significant factors behind the trend of 
strikes, then why not explicitly include them among the  regressors, just like any other 
s t r i k e  d e t e r m i n a n t ,  i n s t ead  of using deflating procedures? (see S tem,  1978; for an 
example of the  use of such deflating procedures, see Hibbs, 1976). 
S e c o n d ,  ' a v e r a g e '  m e a s u r e s ,  such as s i z e  and dura t ion ,  may mask wide 
differences in the  distribution of actual  strike sizes and durations, in particular when 
used f o r  i n t e rna t iona l  comparisons.  The same 'average' size, in fact ,  could be the 
result of a few, large and official strikes for t h e  renewal of industry-wide, collective 
agreements and a large number of small, plant-level strikes (such a s  the Swedish-or 
t h e  Italian cases), or of a grea t  deal of intermediate size strikes, as in t h e  United 
States ,  where plant-level bargaining is the  rule, but  where work-f orce concentration is 
higher (Edwards, 1981:231). Even the  use of t he  median, which is l e s s  sens i t ive  t o  
outliers, is  not exempt from critique, as Shalev has pointed out (see Shalev, 1978:8) 
(aside from the fac t  tha t  the  computation of t h e  median r equ i r e s  informat ion  on 
individual strikes which is generally not available for the postwar period). Perhaps, i t  
would be bet ter  t o  go beyond such misleading measures of central  tendency; f i gu res  
on the  distribution of strikes by size and duration categories, now available for most 
countries, would be much more revealing (see Edwards, 1981:233). 
Final ly ,  in-  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  c o m e  up w i t h  a 'catch-all '  indicator tha t  would 
synthetically combine the  three  basic ones (S, W and H), Galambos and Evans (1966) 
have proposed a composite strike index based on an unweighted average of S, W and 
H. The problem with this type of indicator is t h a t  i t  is based on the  assumption tha t  
Franzosi, Quantitative Strike Research: 10 
S, W and H contribute equally, with the  same weight, t o  total  strike variance. This is 
clearly faulty, though, since, as quantitative r e s e a r c h  has  shown,  S, W and  H a r e  
three different and partly independent measures (for a critique of the Galambos-Evans 
index see Knowles, 1966; see also Franzosi, 1980). 
The Social Definition of a Strike and Other Definitions 
Even under t he  unrealistic assumption tha t  the  problems of data  reliability could 
b e  overcome, official strike da ta  would still present serious limitations. In fact,  "the 
process of defining a strike is a social process" (Batstone et al., 1978:20), involving 
workers a s  well as management. In particular, i t  is usually management's .decision "to 
take the workers off the  clock" ( t h a t  is, suspending p a y m e n t  f o r  id le  t ime)  t h a t  
pr imar i ly  de f ines  a s t r i k e  as such. Thus, even if the  administrative bodies charged 
with da ta  collection made no errors, many work stoppages would go unrecorded simply 
because they would not have been socially defined as strikes. 
Batstone et al. (1978) have argued that,  t o  the ex ten t  tha t  management is more 
l ikely t o  a c c e p t  as leg i  timate--and therefore not define as strikes--work , stoppages 
over safety and working conditions, official strike statistics underestimate the number 
of work s toppages  occurring over such issues. This implies tha t  the traditional view 
tha t  most strikes occur over wage issues may be qui te  exaggera ted  (12). 
Even t h e  re la t ionship  be tween  s t r i k e  activity and the business cycle may be 
distorted as a consequence of the  social definition of a s t r ike .  During prosper i ty ,  
management, concerned with an uninterrupted flow of production, may be less willing 
t o  classify work stoppages as strikes in fear  of antagonizing workers. In t h e  down- 
swing phases  of t h e  cycle,  when orders slacken, such fears vanish and management 
may actually s eek  conf ron ta t ion  in a n  a t t e m p t  t o  r e d u c e  non-fixed costs .  Such 
levelling off between bad and good times in the frequency of work stoppages defined 
as strikes artificially reduces the  dependency of strike frequency upon t h e  business 
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cycle. I 
The issue of t h e  soc i a l  def in i t ion  of a strike brings out yet another central  
methodological problem in quantitative strike analysis. To the  extent  tha t  strikes a r e  
a s o c i a l  p roduc t ,  i.e., t h e  result  of the interaction between at least two parties-- 1 
i 
workers and employers--strike research has given an inadequa te ,  if no t  misleading, 
representation of social reality. In fact ,  most works have looked at strikes as working I 
class actions exclusively, using strike data  t o  assess the  behavior of just one of t h e  
I 
parties involved: the workers. 
Very f e w  s tudies ,  f o r  ins tance ,  h a v e  concentrated on employers' reactions t o  1 
labor unrest (for an example, s e e  S t ea rns ,  1968), o n  t h e i r  vu lnerabi l i ty  t o  s t r i k e  I 
t h r e a t s ,  o r  on t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  pursued by t h e  d i f f e r e n t  parties. To be sure, such 
problems have not been totally ignored in t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  Ashenfe l te r  and  Johnson i 
(1969)--and most  economet r i c  works thereafter--have argued, for instance, that  the  
sign of a profit variable in a strike frequency model is undetermi'ned, s ince,  when 
profits a r e  booming employers are  more likely t o  meet  workers' demands and thwart 
strike threats,  while workers, at the same time, a r e  likely t o  be more strike prone. 
Fa i lu re  of t h e  d a t a  t o  provide sufficient information should not, however, be 
used as an  excuse to  avoid the problem. Alternative routes should be actively sought. 
Pe r rone ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  has  r ecen t ly  a rgued  t h a t  input/output techniques could be 
prof itably used t o  gauge the structural--and not just cyclical--vulnerability to  strikes 
of d i f f e r e n t  indus t r ia l  s e c t o r s  and/or  regions (see Perrone, 1980; see also Conell, 
1980). 
Within a more  general perspective, Korpi has argued that  the power imbalance 
, between workers and  employers ,  s t emming  f r o m  t h e i r  re la t ion  t o  t h e  means  o f  
product ion ,  is t h e  key variable to understanding industrial conflict (see Korpi, 1974, 
1978). In Korpi's power difference model, changes in t he  power position of one party 
with respect t o  the other a f fec t  the probability tha t  the party favored by the change 
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will mobilize resources and engage in collective action. The implications of the model 
a r e  tha t  the actions and s trategies  of one party cannot be unders tood  in isolat ion,  
w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  act ions and s trategy of the opposing party(s). Within this 
perspective, the  range of actions available t o  employers is much broader than what is 
implied by the social definition of a strike. 
Management ' s  b roader  s t r a t e g y  will in general be one of trying t o  lower the 
probability of industrial conflict by ra i s ing  t h e  c o s t  of workers '  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
th rough  such  tac'tics as: discriminating among workers in terms of pay and career  
opportunities, f ining, i so la t ing ,  and dismissing ' t roublesome'  workers ,  s e t t i n g  up  
b l ack l i s t s  of undes i rab le  workers  t o  b e  c i r c u l a t e d  among employers, rotating and 
transferring workers from one p l an t  and one  s h o p  t o  ano the r ,  and  banning union 
activities from inside the plant (13). 
In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  no l e s s  s ign i f i can t  is t h e  ro l e  played by a th i rd  party of 
industrial relations systems: the  state (see Crouch, 1978). Government intervention in 
labor  d isputes ,  bo th  in r ep re s s ive  o r  conciliatory terms, has a long and extensive 
history, ranging  f r o m  use  of po l ice  f o r c e ,  t o  l eg i s l a t i ve  measures ,  l abor  c o u r t  
hearings, forced arbitration, etc. The importance of such strategies, and of repression 
in particular, is not only central  t o  Marxist tradition. Repression, in  f a c t ,  is  a key  
v a r i a b l e  in many p o w e r ' m o d e l s ,  whe re  t h e  probabi l i ty  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion  i s  
postulated t o  be  inversely proportional t o  the  amount of repression applied against i t  
(see Tilly, 1973; see also Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966). Yet no a t t empt  has been 
made in the  l i terature t o  find satisfying measures f o r  t h e  concep t ,  o r  at l e a s t  t o  
provide evidence of another kind (14). 
Pe rhaps ,  wha t  is needed is a d i f f e r en t  definition of a strike, one that  could 
account for these shortcomings. In this respect,  Batstone's concept of work stoppage 
would be more useful than that  of strike, since i t  takes employers' behavior partially 
into account. The concept retains, in fact ,  t he  central  elements of the  definition of 
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'striket--that workers intentionally and temporarily refuse to  work, pending resolution 
of a dispute with management, for which a g r i evance  and/or a demand has been 
expressed (see also Edwards, 1981:287)--yet a lso  offers  a measure of employers' 
reactions, in so far  a s  management is more or less prone to  define a strike depending 
upon the issue. 
Management, however, may be also more or  less prone to make concessions and 
eschew even a work stoppage, depending upon cyc l i ca l  and s t ruc tu ra l  f a c t o r s  (see 
Conell,  1980). So, even work stoppages do not tell us the whole story. Many voiced 
labor grievances, in fact,  never develop into e i t h e r  work stoppages or  s tr ikes.  As 
Batstone et al. write: "if we want to understand strikes we have also to understand 
non-strikes" (Batstone et al., 1978:26) (15). 
Only separate and detailed information on labor grievances, work stoppages, and 
strikes would account fully for the dialectic process involved in industrial relat ions,  
for the conditions that  affect  both workers' mobilization processes and management's 
willingness to  give in to  strikers, bargain or resist demands. 
Inferring the extent of workers' discontent and class conflict from strike activity 
alone could be quite misleading (see Korpi, 1978; Edwards, 1981:297-301). Not only 
because a great deal of work stoppages never make i t  into the statistics, or because 
. many grievances never even develop into work stoppages, but also because many other 
f o r m s  of  labor protest are used, both collectively-work t o .  the rule, i.e., rigorously 
applying the norms contained in the collective contract, slow-downs, non-cooperation, 
sabotage--and individually--absenteeism, turnover (16). 
Unfortunately, the problems involved in collecting information on these  o the r  
forms of industrial conflict a re  even more complex (except for labor turn-over) than 
those involved in strike statistics. As a consequence, there exists very little reliable 
evidence  t h a t  could be  used to  assess labor strategy in chosing among alternative 
forms of industrial conflict. 
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Determinants of Strikes: S ta te  of the Economy and Strike Activity 
The importance of reliable data  is never emphasized enough. Theory building and 
empirical testing, in fact, a r e  complementary processes, with empirical testing being 
comprised of both data  and methodology. Up t o  this point I have discussed at length 
t h e  problems involved in relying upon official data. In the next sections I turn to 
focus on the  methodological aspects of empirical testing. The discussion will  c e n t e r  
o n  t w o  of t h e  most  successful areas  of application of the quantitative approach as 
they have historically developed: the study of the  relationship between strike activity 
and  t h e  business  cyc l e ,  and  t h e  study of  political/organizational determinants of 
strikes. 
A f r u i t f u l  a r e a  of appl ica t ion  of t he  quantitative approach, and one tha t  has 
enjoyed a long tradition of inquiry, has been the  study of economic determinants of 
strikes, in particular frequency . Quantitative research has shown beyond doubt, across 
different institutional sett ings (sample periods and c o u n t r i e s )  t h a t  s t r i k e  f r equency  
fol lows t h e  business  c y c l e  a n d  t h e  movement  of unemployment in particular--the 
higher t he  level of unemployment, the  lower the  number of strikes (17). 
The reasons for this inverse relationship were succinctly laid out by Rees (1952). 
According t o  Rees, in t imes of rising employment workers can more easily find a new 
job in  case of r e t a l i a t o r y  dismissal ,  and/or  f ind p a r t - t i m e  jobs during a strike. 
Employers, on the  other hand, during a strike can less eas i ly  r ep l ace  s t r i k e r s  wi th  
ou t s ide r s  and  'in any  case a r e  less  willing t o  interrupt production, being afraid of 
losing their share of an expanding market. Also, demonstration e f fec ts  of rising wages 
in other firms a r e  likely t o  induce employers t o  give in to  strikers. Under conditions 
of full employment, workers a r e  thus in a more favorable posi t ion t h a n  employers ,  
and are more willing to go on strike. 
In t imes of falling employment, the situation is reversed. Workers are afraid to  
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f o r m  new unions in non-unionized establishments, since troublesome workers can be 
replaced easily. Employers can fill orders out  of inventories. The  g e n e r a l  downward 
s t i ck ines s  of wages, fixed term union contracts,  and falling consumer prices help t o  
further explain the  unions' more cautious approach in the  bargaining process and their 
reluctance to  strike. 
This interpretation, however, has not gone unchallenged. A scholarly controversy, 
between those who claim tha t  strike activity is negatively and significantly related t o  
t h e  l e v e l  of unemployment, or  more generally t o  the business cycle, and those who 
oppose such a view, can be traced back t o  the  seminal works by Rist and March in 
France at the beginning of the century. 
T h e  con t rove r sy  partly s tems from a tendency, among all  involved, t o  identify 
strike activity with just one of i ts  components, frequency. In f a c t ,  while  i t  is t r u e  
tha t  strike frequency follows the  business cycle, as supported by much research, it is 
also t rue  tha t  frequency represents only one measure of s t r i k e  ac t iv i ty .  The  o t h e r  
components depend much less on the fluctuations of economic activity (March, 1911, 
19 13; Forcheimer, 1948; Knowles, 1952:146; Andreani ,  1968; Skeels ,  1971; Walsh, 
1975). Fu r the rmore ,  while s t r i k e  f requency  i s  nega t ive ly  related to  the level of 
unemployment, there is evidence supporting a positive relationship for duration (e.g., 
see Turner, Clack and Roberts, 1967). 
S e v e r a l  a rguments  have been advanced against the view that  relates strikes t o  
the  state of the economy. We have already seen how the  relationship between strike 
frequency and prosperity is a priori ambiguous, since during prosperity employers a r e  
more likely t o  meet  workers' demands, but workers a r e  likely t o  be more strike prone 
( see  Ashenfe l t e r  and Johnson,  19  69; Cous ineau  and  Lacroix, 1976; Conell, 1980). 
Edwards has argued tha t  this combination of forces  affecting s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  during 
prosperity is likely t o  vary from cycle to  cycle. As a result, the  overall e f f ec t  of the 
business cycle on strikes is limited ( see  Edwards,  1981:67). In f a c t ,  accord ing  t o  
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Edwards "the view t h a t  s t r i k e  ac t iv i ty  will depend on the  business cycle has won 
rather too easy acceptance1' (Edwards, 198 1 :67). In any .case, economic de te rminan t s  
of strikes may be indeed statistically significant without, however, being the main or 
exclusive influence (Vanderkamp, 1970). Given the  high explanatory power achieved in 
regressing strike frequency upon a set of seasonal dummy variables alone and/or upon 
a time trend, i t  has been contended t h a t  t h e r e  is  "a s t rong suspicion t h a t  such 
equat ions  might be saying a litt le more than that strikes have increased over time, 
and that  they have a seasonal pattern" (Mayhew, 1979:lO; see also Franzosi, 1981). 
Some scholars have even challenged the dependence of strike frequency upon the 
business cycle in institutional settings different from the post World War I1 Anglo- 
American ones, where strike frequency models have most successfully been tested (see 
Snyder, 1975, 1977). Although such arguments have been damagingly criticized both on 
methodological  and theore t ica l  grounds (181, there is evidence that the relationship 
between economic and strike variables is not stable over long sample periods (19). As 
a consequence, Cronin suggested that  "long-term models, . . . which specify fixed and 
stable interactions and a constant pattern of causat ion ,  should not  work" (Cronin, 
1979:74). The proper temporal unit of analysis would rather consist in sets of social 
and economic homogeneous relationships within spec i f i c  periods (Cronin, 1979; s e e  
also, Boyer, 1979). 
On an even more genera l  t h e o r e t i c a l  level ,  severa l  a rguments  have been 
advanced against the view that  relates prosperity t o  increases  in t h e  frequency of 
strikes. 
F i r s t ,  L e v i t t  a r g u e d  t h a t  during prosperi ty,  in par t icular  a f t e r  severa l  
uninterrupted years of prosperity, workers a r e  likely t o  incur long-term financial  
obligations for housing and durable consumer goods, thereby becoming more dependent 
on weekly paychecks. "The prospect of a strike of even two weeks durat ion can  b e  
fr ightening to a debt-burdened worker" (Levitt, 1953:225). During depressions, on the 
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other hand, in a general c l imate of job insecurity and negative expectations about the 
future, workers a r e  less likely t o  incur these fixed-term debt payments; credit, also, 
is less readily available. 
Even broader  soc i a l  changes--according t o  Levitt--have contributed to  making 
workers more dependent upon a continuous cash flow. The increasing number of young 
nuc lea r  fami l ies ,  t h e  higher  b i r th  r a t e s  t h a t  k e e p  young mothers out of the job 
market,  the  diminishing number of unmarried income producing r e l a t ives  living wi th  
t h e  fami ly ,  a l l  po in t  t o  t h e  more  common situation in which family well-being is 
dependent on one income-earning individual. The broader scope of s t r i k e s  in  r e c e n t  
t i m e s  and t h e  g r e a t e r  p reva lence  of one-industry towns also makes i t  harder for 
strikers t o  find temporary employment elswhere. On the  basis of these observat ions,  
L e v i t t  concluded t h a t  " the  number ,  frequency, and effectiveness of strikes during 
periods of mature prosperity may be  expected t o  dec l ine  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  increase1 '  
(Leyitt, 1953:226) (20). 
Second, Pizzorno has argued tha t  industrial relations a r e  less and less limited to  
collective bargaining, where labor market mechanisms c a n  s igni f icant ly  a f f e c t  t h e  
sho r t - t e rm bargaining power of the parties. Political factors  have come t o  play an 
increasing role everywhere .  While under  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining workers  exchange  
continuity in production against greater  resources (i.e., strikes vs. non-strikes), under 
political exchange consensus and social order a r e  at stake. To the  extent  t ha t  under 
po l i t i ca l  exchange  bargaining power is less dependent upon labor market conditions, 
strike activity can  be  expected t o  become less sensitive t o  fluctuations in the  level 
of economic  a c t i v i t y  (Pizzorno, 1978; see also, Boyer, 1979; Franzosi, 1981:90-102). 
Furthermore, under political exchange not only the  lower dependence upon the  cycle, 
but  the very way consensus is obtained may af fec t  long-term movements and shapes 
of strikes (see Lange, 1979). 
Nonethe less ,  d e s p i t e  these criticisms, the  dependence of strike frequency upon 
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the  business cycle is one of the clearest findings of econometric research. Even those 
authors opposed t o  such a view have conceded t h a t  there exists a short-run positive 
c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  s t r i k e s  and  prosper i ty  ( s e e  L e v i t t ,  1953:581) or, even more 
strongly, t h a t  "during t h e  1930s as much as a t  o t h e r  t imes ,  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  was  
r e l a t e d  t o  economic  conditions" (Edwards, 1981:148). What is much more debatable, 
and indeed very unclear, is the  e f fec t  of the business  c y c l e  upon a l l  o t h e r  s t r i k e  
components, besides frequency. 
Beyond Economic Models of Strikes 
If economic  d e t e r m i n a n t s  play a significant role only on frequency, and each 
strike component measures a different aspect of s t r ike a c t i v i t y  wha t  t hen  a r e  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  of size, du ra t ion  a n d  all o t h e r  s t r ike  components? Economists have 
played a major role in pinning down the e f f e c t  of t h e  business  c y c l e  upon s t r i k e  
frequency. In recent years sociologists and political scientists have concentrated their 
attention on the  other strike components, in particular size. 
This is not t o  say tha t  economists ever denied the existence of other forces at 
work. However, even the mos t  c r i t i c a l  and thorough among  t h e m  have  n o t  gone  
beyond s o m e  vague  not ion  a b o u t  soc ia l  and  po l i t i ca l  cor re la tes  of strikes--union 
strength, in particular-in works o the rwi se  wholly c e n t e r e d  on pr ices ,  wages  and  
unemployment  (e.g., see Griffin, 1939; Knowles, 1952). The search for non-economic 
determinants of strikes has taken various routes. 
F i r s t ,  . long-run movemen t s  of s t r i k e s  h a v e  been inves t iga t ed  in relation to  
I 
I 
changes in the  political economy of the  distribution of resources--national income, in 
p a r t i c u l a r .  Accord ing  t o  Hibbs, t h e  high pa r t i c ipa t ion  of labor  f o r c e s  in t h e  
management and control of the  distribution of  r e sou rces  h a s  sh i f t ed  t h e  locus of 
industrial conflict from the labor market and the  private sector, where strike activity 
is the  typical means of pressure, t o  the public one, where barga in ing  and  po l i t i ca l  
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- 
exchange prevail (Hibbs, 1976; see also Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980). 
Comparative research has shown that  strike activity has gone down whenever 
and wherever labor or iented ,  social  d e m o c r a t i c  parties have acquired government 
responsibilities. Direct access t o  political power has provided labor with a l t e rna t ive ,  
less c o s t l y  m e a n s  t o  i t s  ends,  such as t h e  welfare  policies d i rec ted  at the  
redistribution of national income (see Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Hibbs, 1976; Korpi and 
Shalev, 1979, 1980). 
Second, i t  has been argued that major outbursts of labor unrest, or strike waves, 
a re  related t o  shifts in the political position of labor in the  national power structure 
(see  Shor ter  and Tilly, 1974) (21). During strike waves the shape of strikes changes 
drastically, along with the whole repertoire of labor actions. During s t r ike  waves 
w o r k e r s  face up  a g a i n s t  c a p i t a l  and bargain the i r  position a s  a class,  with 
implications that  go fa r  beyond t h e  sys tem of indust r ia l  re la t ions  where s t r ikes  
normally tend t o  be confined. During strike waves the separation of the economic and 
political spheres of conflict-"a fundamental basis of the capi ta l i s t  s t a t e "  (Giddens, 
1973:206; see also Dahrendorf, 1959:277)--breaks down and workers bring their weight 
to  bear upon the  legitimacy of the existing power structure. Also, while normally a 
g r e a t  dea l  of industr ial  conf l i c t  occurs  over  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of wages--i.e., wage 
differentials among industrial sectors, among firms within a sec to r ,  among workers 
within a firm--during strike waves i t  is the distribution of income among classes, and 
not just within the working class, that  is challenged (on the  revolutionary potential of 
strike waves--or mass strikes a s  the author defines them-see Brecher, 1972). 
In view of their importance, i t  is surprising that  so  few monographs ex i s t  on 
individual strike waves (e.g., see Pizzono,  1974-19781, and that  so little attention has 
been paid in the literature t o  the concomitant occurence of outbreaks of indust r ia l  
c o n f l i c t  ac ross  countr ies  otherwise characterized by wide differences in levels of 
industrialization, composition of t h e  labor f o r c e ,  pol i t ica l  regimes  and indust r ia l  
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relations systems (e.g., see Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978). 
A third line of inquiry has concentrated on the  organizational bas i s  of s t r i k e s  
w i t h  r e sou rce -managemen t  models  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ions  ( for  such models,  see 
Obershall, 1973; Tilly, 1974; Gamson, 1975). Shorter and Tilly (1974) have shown t h a t  
s t r i k e  s i z e  and organiza t ion ,  as measured  by unionizat ion,  go together (see also 
Andreani, 1968). It is the  organizational ability of t rade unions tha t  enables them t o  
call on strike a larger portion of the work force. In the  long run, strikes a r e  less and 
less the  result of spontaneous outbreaks  of workers1  hanger .  Although such  angry  
protests a r e  not at all uncommon, particularly in early days (see Stearns, 1974, 1975; 
Hobsbawm, 1964), worke r s  have  l ea rned  f a s t  '"the common sense  of  demanding 
concess ions  when condi t ions  a r e  favourable, not when hunger suggests" (Hobsbawm, 
1964:144). Furthermore, strike activity is not the  result of a n  " isolated mass" ( s ee  
Ker r  and  Siegel ,  1954) o r  of t h e  l e a s t  i n t e g r a t e d  members  of a working class 
community. 
Taken together, research on non-economic determinants of strikes has met with 
a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  s u c c e s s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  m a n y  p r o b l e m s  s t i l l  r e m a i n .  
To  begin with,  the empirical testing of long-term political hypotheses (Skeels, 1971; 
Hibbs, 1976, 1978; Korpi  and  Shalev,  1980) has  been  based a l m o s t  exclusively,  
a l t hough  t o  some  e x t e n t  successfully, on dummy variables (cabinet change, election 
year, party in power). Given the  inadequacy of such var iab les ,  much m o r e  work is 
needed both in terms of model specification and variable operationalization (22). Even 
at the  theoretical level Edwards has recently systematically challenged the  view tha t  
re lates  strikes t o  shifts in the political position of labor (see Edwards, 1981; see also 
Smith, 1979). 
Second, unionization and strike activity go together mostly during strike waves, 
as these a r e  o f t e n  accompan ied  by high jumps in  union membership.  This fact 
subs t an t i a l l y  reduces  the  number of available observations, since there a r e  no more 
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than a handful of strike waves even over the  t ime span of a century (see Shorter and 
Tilly, 1973; Edwards, 1981 :28-9; Cronin, 1979:39). Thus, although the  sample period on 
which the regression is being performed may be quite long, the effective number of 
observations significant for t he  relationship under consideration may  w e  11 f a l l  below 
minimum requirements. 
Furthermore, unionization variables usually perform well in a regression model of 
number of strikers. This, however, can hardly be  taken as an  explanation in a causal 
sense. Econometricians have in f a c t  just as successfully reversed the  causal order in 
union g r o d h  models, where unionization becomes t h e  'dependent' variable and number 
of strikers the 'independent' one (23). Joining a union is likely t o  represent a further 
s t e p  in  workers '  c o m m i t t m e n t  and  class consc iousness  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  s t r i k e  
participation implying tha t  unionization is a consequence of strike participation, rather 
than a cause (see Perrot, 1973; see also Edwards, 1981:29). It is only data  aggregation 
o v e r  t i m e  t h a t  m a k e s  t h e s e  t w o  a s p e c t s  of mobi l iza t ion  p roces ses  appea r  
contemporaneous. 
Third, it is not always easy to  separate organizational e f fec ts  from background 
effects.  Do unionized firms pay higher wages because workers a r e  organized and can 
s t r i k e  m o r e  e f f ec t ive ly?  Or, a r e  some firms and industrial sectors bet ter  organized 
because- of some inherent structural features conducive  t o  o rgan iza t ion ,  c o l l e c t i v e  
actions and higher strike returns (see Ashenfelter, Johnson and Pencavel, 1972)? There 
is evidence tha t  the  same structural features l ie  behind low s t r i k e  proneness ,  low 
s t r i k e  r e t u r n s  and o rgan iza t ion  weaknesses  (see Conell, 1980:264). In other words, 
there is some t ru th  t o  the  statement:  "workers' ability t o  obtain concessions depended. 
heavi ly  on where they worked and very l i t t le  on how they were organized" (Conell, 
1980:83). ' 
In c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e n ,  s t r i k e  s i z e  models  based on unionizat ion may yield 
significant and highly e x p l i c a t i v e  resul ts .  Y e t ,  w e  may h a v e  done no more  than  
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obse rve  a s t rong  co r re l a t ion ,  leaving unresolved the problem of pinning down the 
common causes of these highly interrelated phenomena. Goetz-Girey, for  instance, has 
claimed indeed that "the fundamental movements t h a t  originate strikes are often the 
1 
same tha t  originate union growth.  When w e  o b s e r v e  a co r re l a t ion  be tween union , 
growth and s tr ike activity, t h a t  does not necessarily mean tha t  union growth is a t  the \ 
origin of increases in strike activity. It is the  same causes t h a t  affect at the same 
t i m e  union g rowth  and  s t r i k e  activity. In particular, industrialization and economic 
cycles have  a n  effect on bo th  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  a n d  union growth"  (Goetz-Girey,  
1965:146-7; see also Edwards, 1981:9). 
Exclusive reliance on highly aggregated unionization figures also appears to  have 
exaggerated the role of formal organization at t h e  e x p e n s e  of i n fo rma l  shop-floor 
leadership (see Batstone et al., 1978). 
T o  c o m p l i c a t e  m a t t e r s  even further, in most countries the number of workers 
involved and the  number of hours lost a r e '  very sensitive t o  outliers, since just one or  
two strikes can account for as much as 70 t o  90 per cent  of all strikers and hours 
lost in a year (24). The explanation of such one or  two strikes per year is probably 
beyond econometric testing and current da ta  availability. It may be more fruitful t o  
isolate large strikes and study them in a m o r e  s y s t e m a t i c  way ove r  t ime ,  with a 
combina t ion  of quan t i t a t i ve  and qualitative techniques (e.g., for a qualitative study 
see Brecher, 1972). 
Finally, Stern (1978) has pointed out  t ha t  most' of these works have done li t t le 
more than add political/organizational measures t o  economic strike models, or extend 
the  analysis t o  other strike components besides frequency (e.g., see Vanderkamp, 1970; 
Snyder, 1975; ~ o r d o ~ n a  and Provas i ,  1979). F r o m  a n  e m p i r i c a l  s t andpo in t  S te rn ' s  
I 
criticisms address a severe shortcoming of this body of literature. To  be fair, though, 
i one should add  t h a t  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  has  la id  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  foundat ions  f o r  a n  
I approach t o  strikes tha t  would go beyond the restricted view of strikes a s  "the result 
I 
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of  f a u l t y  negot ia t ions"  (Hicks, 1957:146). Furthermore, some a t tempts  at specifying 
alternative models have been made, although, admittedly, their empirical basis is not 
very strong (e.g., see Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Snyder and Kelly, 1976). 
Economic Versus Political/Organizational Strike Models: Striving for Integration 
Two different sets  of questions will be  addressed in this section: First, why has 
there been so little integration of t he  economic and political/organizational s t r e a m s  
of research? Second, why has there been so much disparity in empirical findings? 
There now exists a grea t  deal of empirical evidence independently develbped by 
economists on the  economic determinants of strikes, and by sociologists and political 
scientists on the organizational and political correlates. Yet l i t t le i n t eg ra t ion  of  a l l  
t h i s  m a t e r i a l  has  been a t t e m p t e d .  As Waldman has  r ight ly pointed out,  such a 
separation between political and economic v a r i a b l e s  does  no t  belong t o  h i s to r i ca l  
reality and by seeking one or the  other the connection is missed (Waldman, 1976:159). 
To a large degree, the  academic division of labor and our needs  as model  bu i lders  
may h a v e  led t o  t h i s  unnecessary dichotomy. More serious obstacles, however, have 
stood in the way of integration. 
A f i rs t  obstacle s tems from the  f ac t  tha t  not a l l  strike determinants operate in 
t he  same t ime frame: the business cycle, for  instance, a f fec ts  strike activity in t he  
s h o r t  and  medium run, while t echno log ica l  c h a n g e  or  organizat ion are  likely to  
operate  in the  very long run. Correct model specification would require including all  
relevant variables in the model, and testing would have to  be carried out on a t ime 
f rame long enough to  encompass short, medium, and long term effects.  
Th i s  in  i t se l f  should not be too much of a problem, but i t  is likely t o  become 
one in t he  context of regression analysis applied t o  a t ime-ser ies  model  1) where  
v a r i a b l e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  t rended ,  2 )  which is l ikely t o  su f f e r  f rom model  
misspecification, at least to some extent ,  since only a minor por t ion  of all f a c t o r s  
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involved a r e  usually considered in econometric models. Either problem may result in 
autocorrelated errors  (see Johnston, 1972:243-65; Granger  and  Newbold, 1974). T h e  
c h o i c e  then  becomes  one  of a c c e p t i n g  unbiased  but  i ne f f i c i en t  and inconsistent 
est imates  for the coefficients in  t h e  model,  o r  de t rending  in o rde r  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
autocorrelation (see Granger and Newbold, 1974). However, detrending, i.e., taking the  
long-term component out of a series, may distort  some of t h e  re la t ionships  in t h e  
model. What if, as in our case, some of the  variables a r e  in f ac t  related precisely in 
t he  long run? 
On  a m o r e  gene ra l  level ,  o n e  could ques t ion  t h e  very  appropr i a t enes s  of 
regression techniques applied t o  t ime series data.  Indeed, from e c o n o m e t r i c  o u t p u t s  
t h e r e  is no way of telling t o  which t ime frames--frequency bands as they would be 
called in t ime series spectral analysis--estimated coefficients refer  to. Such knowledge 
must necessarily come from a priori information. One would feel  more confortable if 
such  a p r io r i  assumpt ions  could b e  t e s t e d  empir ica l ly .  Techniques  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
conceived t o  handle t ime dependent data,  such as spectral analysis or ARIMA models, 
would be  more adequate (25). 
Another  consequence  of t h e  var ious  t i m e  f r a m e s  in which different  factors 
operate  is tha t  testing alternative sets of hypotheses will require different degrees of 
involvement  in d a t a  collection. For instance, business cycle effects,  tha t  operate in 
t h e  short and medium run, can be  easily tested with relatively short series and minor 
d a t a  co l l ec t ion  e f f o r t s  (considering a l so  t h a t  most  economic  d a t a  a r e  readi ly 
available). Organizational and political factors, which a r e  more l ikely t o  o p e r a t e  in  
t h e  long run, will need longer series. Considering tha t  generally non-economic da ta  
a r e  not readily available, the  task confronting social scientists working on quantitative 
s t r ike research is not an easy one, o r  one t h a t  could lead to  'fast and ready' answers. 
Data collecting. work is in itself of l i t t le reward, but in the end it may prove very 
fruitful, as has been suggested on several occasions in the course of this paper. 
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A common  p r a c t i c e ,  followed by researchers in recent years as a s ta r t  toward 
integration, has consisted in regressing various strike measures upon the  same set of 
k e y  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s :  e c o n o m i c ,  po l i t i ca l  a n d  o rgan iza t iona l  (e.g., see 
~ a n d e r k a h ~ ,  1970; Skeels, 197 1; Snyder, 1975; Bordogna and Provasi, 1979; Franzosi ,  
1981). Edwards writes "it . . . seems useful t o  explore the  role of the  same model in 
explaining different features  of strikes, while bearing in mind t h a t  s t r i k e  f r equency  
and worker involvement may be influenced by different factors" (Edwards, 198 1 :73). 
However, if such a so lu t ion  may have  s o m e  i n t u i t i v e  appea l ,  i t  has  s e r ious  
methodologica l  pi t fal ls .  In f a c t ,  if t h e  models a r e  indeed misspecified, and strike 
frequency and worker involvement a r e  influenced by other f a c t o r s  bes ides  t h e  ones  
accoun ted  fo r  in  t he  model, then the regression est imates  will be inconsistent, i.e., 
with very large 'variances. This f ac t  rules o u t  s t anda rd  tests of s ign i f icance  as a 
criterion of acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis and casts serious doubt on 
the  overall value of such procedures. To the  ex ten t  t ha t  t he  statistical consequences 
of  model  misspecification a re  not kept in mind, such procedures may easily lead to  
incorrect substantive interpretations. 
' In tegra t ion ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  is no t  likely t o  c o m e  from these kinds of mechanical 
procedures. A more promising solution seems t o  come, instead, f rom t h o s e  t h e o r i e s  
t h a t  c a n  i n c o r p o r a t e  all r e l e v a n t  factors--be t h e s e  economic  o r  pol i t ical / -  
organizational-in a coherent and comprehensive framework. Korpi, fo r  i n s t ance ,  has  
brought together relative deprivation and economic hardship in an essentially political 
power model, but where changes in economic conditions can a l te r  a 'group's stock of 
power resources. 
T h e  a r g u m e n t  sounds ve ry  much l ike arguments  underlying bargaining models. 
Korpi's model, though, is much broader. It can account for both short-term changes in 
t h e  power position of a group, as affected by such factors as the  business cycle, and 
long-term changes in the  locus of con f l i c t ,  as a f f e c t e d  by s h i f t s  in t h e  po l i t i ca l  
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position of labor. Economic variables are central t o  bargaining models. Differences in 
power, as perhaps affected by economic conditions, but by no means  by these  ones 
alone, constitute the core of Korpi's model (see Korpi, 1974, 1978). 
Turning t o  the  second question, there are  several reasons why there should be so 
much dispari ty in empirical findings, given that  most studies have differed in their 
selection of the  basic observation period (month,  q u a r t e r ,  year),  of t h e  various 
measures of strike activity (frequency, size, duration, volume), of the sample periods 
analyzed, and of the  specification of the overall model and/or of the functional form 
of a particular relationship. 
W e  would e x p e c t  t h e  choice  of temporal aggregation to  make a difference, in 
view of the f ac t  that  the more highly aggregated the data, the  more will be missed 
in t e r m s  of high frequency variation. Furthermore, overtime aggregation is likely to  
distort relationships among variables. For instance, one of t h e  main f o c i  of s t r ike  
research  has been t h e  p r i ce  expectat ion-wage relat ionship (see Ashenfelter and 
Johnson, 1969; Pencavel, 1970; Snyder, 1975; Hibbs, 1976). Empirical  t e s t s  of th is  
hypothesis have often been based on yearly data (see Snyder, 1975; Hibbs, 1976; see 
also Smith, 1979). Yet the difficulties of satisfactorily estimating short lag-structures 
with highly aggregated data are  well known (see, Mundlak, 1961) (26) (27). 
Second, several different strike measures, deflated in several different ways, have 
been used (28). All in all, there .seems to be agreement among scholars in the field 
that  frequency is negatively related to  the business cycle, and tha t  the fewer strike 
occurrences  during recessions tend t o  l a s t  longer. Findings are  also consistent in 
showing much less dependency of other strike components upon the  cycle. Yet, these 
l a s t  findings may be  more the  resul t  of f a i lu re  on the  p a r t  of researchers  to  
recognize first, and then deal with, difficulties involved in properly es t imat ing  t h e  
relationship between level of economic activity and strike size and time lost. 
One of the  problems is  that  the distribution of strikes by size and time lost is 
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highly skewed,  making  such  measures  very  sensitive to.  a handful of exceptionally 
large and long strikes. As i t  has been suggested already, i t  may be more appropriate 
t o  t ake  ou t  such strikes for separate analysis, e i ther  quantitative or qualitative. There 
is evidence t h a t  a series of number of strikers d e f l a t e d  in t h e  way proposed h e r e  
m a y  b e  as sens i t i ve  t o  t h e  business c y c l e  as t h e  number  of s t r i k e s  itself (see 
Franzosi, 198 1). 
Ano the r  sou rce  of d i f f i cu l t i e s  is t h a t  s t r i k e  s i z e  and  duration, may have a 
considerable impact upon production and the  economy in g e n e r a l  ( s ee  d e  Wasseige, 
1952; Franzosi, 1981). Thus, when production or  GNP figures a r e  used as indicators of 
economic activity in models of strike size, duration, or  volume, we a re  likely t o  ge t  
r e s u l t s  d i s tor ted  by reciprocal causation (29). Model specification, in other words, is 
likely t o  make a difference, and t h e  var ious  e c o n o m i c  ind ica tors  canno t  b e  used 
indifferently with the expectation tha t  they will perform the same way. 
There is another a s p e c t  of model  spec i f i ca t ion  t h a t  c a n  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t e  
comparability of results. In fact ,  even models t ha t  a r e  identically ' specified and that  
use the  same level' of aggregation can sti l l  differ in terms of the  functional form of 
a particular, relationship. For instance, Edwards, in re-estimating the Ashenfelter and 
Johnson model, makes use of an inadequately justified "difference between the rates  
of c h a n g e  of wages  and  pr icesn  ins tead  of a d i s t r i bu ted  lag form (see Edwards, 
1981:72). Although such differences may sound like details, i t  should be r emembered  
t h a t  i n c o r r e c t  spec i f i ca t ion  of t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  f o r m  of t h e  relationship between 
variables is as serious a problem, with as undes i r ab le  s t a t i s t i c a l  consequences  as 
omission of variables itself (see Johnston, 1972:243-4). 
Finally, no two works in this literature have analyzed the s a m e  sample  period. 
W e  already saw above tha t  the strength and even the sign of the relationship between 
strikes and their determinants is likely t o  c h a n g e  ove r  t i m e  ac ros s  homogeneous 
historical periods. It is no surprise, then, tha t  works tha t  have addressed different and 
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r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  s ample  per iods  have ob ta ined  d i f f e r e n t  resul ts .  What is more 
surprising is tha t  a clear chronology of a l l  s u c h  homogeneous per iods  f o r  var ious  
countries is sti l l  lacking. 
Because  of such d i f f e rences ,  it is hard to ge t  a sense of cumulative evidence 
from this  literature. It is not, however, fortuitous tha t  works have differed so much 
in te rms  of sample period, level of aggregation and model specification. A number of 
these works were, in fact ,  aimed at showing t h a t  economic models do not work for 
c e r t a i n  coun t r i e s ,  c e r t a i n  periods or cer tain strike measures. Despite their obvious 
inadequacies, economic models had dominated t h e  field for many decades .  I t  is  no t  
surprising tha t  a crit ical s tance  developed. 
O n e  can  now see a similar reaction developing vis a vis political/organizational 
models, Shorter and Tilly's in  pa r t i cu l a r .  Edwards,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  on t h e  basis  of 
regress ion  r e su l t s  for the United States, concludes: "The failure of union density to  
opera te  significantly in combination with the  more general economic var iab les  c a s t s  
v e r y  g r e a t  d o u b t  o n  t h e  v i ew t h a t  o rgan iza t iona l  f a c t o r s  must  be  given a n  
independent role in the  determination of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y "  (Edwards, 198  1 :77). Yet ,  
a g a i n s t  Edwards'  own recommendat ion (see Edwards, 1981:73), only one measure of 
strike activity was used. Furthermore, a measure well known t o  be poorly related t o  
unionization figures, i.e., strike frequency, was chosen. 
It  is t ime tha t  such discrepancies b e  a d d r e s s e d  d i r ec t ly ,  with a n  e y e  toward  
i so la t ing  homogeneous per iods  during which some given set of correlates seems to  
work, and  toward  expla in ing  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  p e r f o r m a n c e  b e t w e e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
spec i f i ca t ions  (30). W e  should not be content  with simply showing tha t  differences 
exist. We ought t o  explain such differences. For instance, we cannot reject  economic 
models simpy because GNP does not perform as well a s  unemployment in a regression 
equation (e.g., see Vanderkamp,  1970; Snyder ,  1975). In f a c t ,  n o t  a l l  economic  
indicators can be expected t o  perform the same way. Yet, no a t t empt  has been made 
Franzosi, Quantitative Strike Research: 29 
to  go beyond reporting the mere findings (see, however, Franzosi, 1981). 
In view of t h e s e  cons idera t ions  t h e r e  is a growing need for  repl icat ion of 
previous works, in order to directly address discrepancies in the field. Failure to do 
so would perpetuate the  indefinite testing of models which a r e  based on d i f fe ren t  
levels  of aggregation, sample periods and model specifications, and would not allow 
accumulation or integration of knowledge. 
Discrepancies in empir ica l  findings, though, may ac tual ly  hide much more 
fundamental problems. Because, a s  every practitioner knows a l l  too  well, empir ica l  
evidence is never clear cut. There is always a choice involved. which will bring about 
the  researcher's own construction of reality. The guiding criterion in selecting among 
con t ras t ing  b i t s  of information--e.g., magnitude,  sign, significance of regression 
coefficients--may well  u l t imate ly  depend upon t h e  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  p e r s o n a l  a n d  
t h e o r e t i c a l  biases, upon his belonging t o  a shared scientific paradigm. So, by and 
large, our theories guide us in the  process of reconstructing social reality. Yet, this 
reality is used t o  uphold theories that  we so independently set out to  verify. 
Further Issues and Alternative Approaches 
These critical considerations bring out yet  another set of problems that  have not 
been addressed up t o  th i s  point.  In f a c t ,  t h e  d a t a  and methodologica l  i s s u e s  
considered in the previous sections have not challenged the value of the quantitative 
approach. More fundamental  c r i t ic isms,  however, can  be and have been brought 
aga ins t  i t ,  uncovering inadequacies t h a t  directly bear upon the approach as such, 
rather than on its applications. 
In the present section, I will consider some such charges as the consistency of 
aggregate data with different causal structures and different behavioral,  individual- 
level hypotheses, the lack of integration between micro and macro levels of analysis, 
and the phenomenological critique. 
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I t  ha s  been  argued  t h a t ,  a l though q u a n t i t a t i v e  s t r i k e  r e sea rch  purportedly 
endeavours t o  disintangle causal structures, in reality i t  is merely correlational rather 
than causal (see Durand, 1977) (31). The criticism seems to be empirically grounded. 
As I have mentioned earlier, in fact ,  wage determination a n d  union growth  models  
h a v e  just  as successfu l ly  reversed the causal order,  t reat ing the  ra te  of change of 
money wages and unionization as the  'dependent' variables with a measu re  of s t r i k e  
a c t i v i t y  among  t h e  regressors. The data, in other  words, a r e  indeed consistent with 
different causal structures, as Durand would argue. Although statistical causality tests 
a r e  available (e.g., see Granger, 1969; Sims, 19721, they a re  not easily applicable to  
short series. 
The problem is tha t  if Ordinary Least Squares a r e  used to  est imate models where 
there is more than one current endogenous variable in the  relation, whichever variable 
o n e  s e l e c t s  as t h e  'dependent '  var iab le ,  t h e  remain ing  endogenous variable(& in 
general, will be correlated with t h e  e r r o r  t e r m .  Under t h e s e  c i r cums tances ,  OLS 
e s t i m a t e s  wil l  b e  biased and  incons is ten t  ( s e e  Johns ton ,  1972:376). For  proper 
estimation, simultaneous equation techniques should be  applied (either single equation- 
-Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), Limited Information Maximum Likelihood--or system 
of equations-Three Stage Least  Squares and Full Information Maximum Likelihood). 
The  high d e g r e e  of interdependence and reciprocal causation among the main 
variables usually has been recognized and acknowledged (e.g., see Ashenfe l te r  a n d  
Johnson, 1969). Y e t ,  ava i l ab l e  e c o n o m e t r i c  s t r i k e  models, a r e  all Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) single-equation models, in which all independent variables a r e  t r e a t e d  
as exogenous,  i.e., determined outside the model, independent of all other variables 
considered. Only in a few cases have 2SLS e s t i m a t i n g  me thods  been  appl ied ( see  
Pencavel, 1970; Snyder, 1977; Franzosi, 198 1). 
Even simultaneous single equation estimating techniques, such as 2SLS, however, 
do  not  d i r ec t ly  add res s  t h e  complexity of t he  relationships involved, although they 
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provide unbiased and consistent estimates. Only with multiple equation models is such 
complexity built into t he  model, rather than being a mat te r  of statistical estimation. 
T h e r e  i s  y e t  ano the r  reason  why s y s t e m  of equa t ions  models  could prove 
fruitful. In fact ,  such multiple inputlmultiple o u t p u t  s imul taneous  equat ion  models  
could  d e a l  more easily with the  reciprocal interdependencies of all strike indicators, 
accounting for all of them simultaneously. However, there  a r e  s e v e r a l  reasons  why 
such a n  ambitious project may not as yet  be  feasible. 
First, the  f a c t  tha t  au tho r s  who h a v e  s e p a r a t e l y  t ack led  a l l  t h r e e  l ines  of 
research- -s t r ike  frequency,  union growth and wage determination models-have used 
.systems of equations for all models, e x c e p t  f o r  s t r i k e  f requency , .  should make  u s  
a w a r e  of t h e  possible  difficulties involved (e.g., see Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Ashenfel ter ,  Johnson and  ~ e n c a v e l ,  1972). If o n e  
cons iders  t h a t  s t r i k e  f requency  models ,  on which these authors have concentrated 
their attention, have usually achieved the  best statistical results, l i t t l e  hope c a n  b e  
he ld  of being a b l e  t o  spec i fy  mult i -equat ion s t r i k e  models--which would include 
correct  specification of the other strike components as well. 
Second, although there now exists a great  deal of empirical evidence on the way 
institutional and organizational f o r c e s  shape  t h e  p a t t e r n  of s t r i kes ,  mos t  of t h i s  
l i terature does not lend itself to  quantitative analysis (e.g., see Clegg, 1976; Batstone 
et al., 1978). Thus, while we now know a g rea t  deal  about how certain mobilization 
p r o c e s s e s  occu r ,  very  l i t t l e  of t h a t  knowledge  c a n  b e  used in t h e  c o n t e x t  of 
econometric analysis. Furthermore, many of t h e  phenomena t h a t  a r e  wel l  known t o  
affect strikes on a theoretical level (e.g., repression) have received l i t t le  attention at 
the  empirical level, even in very simple quantitative analyses. Again, much more work 
would b e  needed  in t e r m s  of da ta  collection and operationalization of theoretically 
relevant variables before one could hope t o  specify non-trivial, multi-equation s t r i k e  
models. 
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A second a rgumen t ,  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  one  just cons idered ,  h a s  charged  tha t  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  a g g r e g a t e  s t r i k e  models  may b e  cons i s t en t  wi th  many u n d e r l y i n g  
hypotheses at the individual level (see Mayhew, 1979; see also Edwards, 1981:64). The 
argument does not challenge the  value of quantitative strike research as such. It does 
sugges t ,  however ,  t h a t  l i t t l e  is known about t he  behavioral micro-level hypotheses 
underlying aggregate models (32) and tha t  t h e r e  is a need f o r  f u r t h e r  micro-level  
research and integration. 
Going f rom t h e  macro  t o  t h e  micro level of analysis, though, is not an easy 
ma t t e r  since it will usually involve working with an entirely different d a t a  set ( see  
S t e r n ,  1978). Considering that official strike da ta  rarely have been gathered at the 
micro level, hypothesis testing at this level will also require primary 'data collecting 
( 3  3). In any  case, t h e  d i f f i cu l t i e s  involved in specifying econometric models which 
combined mic ro  and m a c r o  in fo rma t ion ,  wi th  even  t h e  s imples t  kind of l inear  
aggregation functions, may be  insurmountable at the  present state of the art .  
It i s  qualitative case studies of strikes t h a t  have provided much of the  detailed 
micro- leve l  in format ion  (34). In f a c t ,  whi le  quan t i t a t i ve  works have centered on 
macro-level variables, case studies have focused on community characteristics, plant- 
level labor relations, workers' consciousness and the like, i.e., on the micro correlates 
of strikes. 
Given t h e  r ichness  of t h e  case-study l i t e r a t u r e ,  i t  i s  r e g r e t t a b l e  t h a t  no 
systematic use or even mention of i ts  findings has been made in quant i ta t ive  works  
(for an  exception, see Edwards, 1981). Such neglect may depend upon the  f ac t  tha t  i t  
is  ha rd  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  such  q u a l i t a t i v e  e v i d e n c e  in e c o n o m e t r i c  models  o r  t o  
g e n e r a l i z e  f rom case studies. Furthermore, although such detailed knowledge is very 
helpful within a more general theoretical framework, by itself i t  is of limited use. 
One way of bridging the  gulf and making the  contribution of this vast body of 
l i t e r a t u r e  bo th  ava i lab le  t o  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s e a r c h e r s  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  m o r e  
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r ep resen ta t ive  would be to compare all this information in a more systematic way, 
and quantify it, a s  if i t  were coming from a sample survey--a non random sample of 
the case-study strikes. Unfortunately, no such task has been undertaken. Another way 
would be t o  integrate qualitative and quan t i t a t ive  evidence,  using t h e  depth and 
r ichness of c a s e  s tud ies  t o  i l lus t r a t e  t h e  micro-level implicat ions of statistical 
findings (e.g., see Edwards, 1981), or to verify the  micro-level assumptions upon which 
aggregate studies rest  (e.g., see Batstone et al., 1978). 
These suggestions should not be taken t o  imply that  statistical extrapolation is 
the only way of going from a case t o  its universe, the only way of understanding the 
relationship of the part to  the  whole (Burawoy, 1979:~IV).  Neither  should they b e  
t aken  t o  imply t h a t  qua l i t a t ive  case-study research  only plays a secondary role, 
subordinate to  quantitative analysis. They should only be  seen  a s  ways of  bringing 
m icro-leve 1 information within aggregate quantitative analyses, as ways of covering 
the most patent deficiencies. 
Neither  the  c a s e  study nor t h e  quan t i t a t ive  l i t e ra tu re  have addressed each 
other's issues, each keeping within its own research t radi t ion ,  and thus  preventing 
comparison and integration of findings a t  various levels of analysis. Rare exceptions 
indicate that  t h e r e  would b e  a g r e a t  dea l  t o  be  learned f rom the i r  sys temat ic  
integration (see Batstone et al., 1978; Edwards, 1981) (35). 
Finally, a more radical critique of the quan t i t a t ive  approach has come f rom 
phenomenologists who have argued t h a t  quan t i t a t ive  evidence is of no value for 
sociological inquiry. They have challenged the Durkheimian view of the very existence 
of immutable social fac ts  (see Durkheim, 1938, 1951) (36). As a result, they have also 
questioned t h e  feasibi l i ty of s tandardizing measurement  ac ross  individuals,  o f  
constructing statistical models and of making inferences (see Douglas, 1967). Finally, 
phenomenologists have regarded official records mainly as the  result of bureaucra t ic  
c a p r i c e  (see Cicourel,  1968, 1974). Reliance on off ic ia l  da ta  would miss out on 
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people's thoughts and perceptions, specifically on what strikes really mean to workers 
and on the micro-level processes that  lead them to  take such course of action. 
Without altogether eschewing the use of quantitative methodologies in the social 
sciences, i t  is true that  quantitative research-+f the econometric type in particular-- 
has  o f t e n  focused too narrowly on what is quantifiable, thus presenting a view that 
even in the authors' opinion is unsatisfactory (37). All too frequently i t  i s  forgot ten  
that  "there are  people behind numbers" (Perrot, 1968:120). 
As we have seen time and again in the course of this paper, exclusive reliance 
/- 
on quantitative evidence neglects some fundamental aspects of strike activity, such as 
the role of informal leadership, management's actions, workers' strategies in terms of 
demands (381, repertoire of actions and strike techniques (see Shalev, 1978:8), and of 
work groups' changing power as affected by their position in the  production process a t  
the  plant level (see Batstone et al., 1978:32). 
Given the  difficulties involved in studying the  relationship between class conflict 
and the  organizat ion of the labor process a t  the macro level, many scholars in the 
Marxist tradition argue tha t  macro-level works miss the central characteristic of class 
conflict: that  the  capitalist organization of the  labor process in the factory and the 
changes unilaterally introduced by management are  the prime source  of conf l ic t  a t  
t h e  point of production (see Ignazio and Costa, 1975; see also Regini and Reyneri, 
1971; Burawoy, 1979; on the  macro-level characteristics of the  relationship between 
technological change and strike activity, see Shorter and' Tilly, 1974). 
Furthermore, as working class actions ge t  crunched in regression coeff ic ients ,  
tests of significance and the like, in most quantitative works .much of the historical 
embedment of strikes is lost, together with the  background .of workers' everyday life 
and conditions, the i r  thoughts  and aspirations, and the deep sense of injustice and 
moral outrage that  a t  t imes  mot ivates  them t o  a c t  col lec t ive ly  (see Barrington 
Moore, 1978; see also Brecher, 1972; Crew, 1979; Procacci, 1971). 
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It is through the  fi l ters of workers' consciousness t ha t  macro-level factors a f fec t  
strike activity. "Because s t r ikes  a r e  n o t  a n  a b s t r a c t  phenomenon: t h e y  involve a 
decision, more or less thought out, more or less spontaneous, tha t  sets in motion the 
motivations, secre t  or  avowed, the r ep re sen ta t ions ,  t h e  hopes, t h e  be l ie fs  of t h e  
a c t o r s .  S t r i k e s  a r e  a beau t i fu l  h i s to r i c  ob jec t :  t h e r e  one  finds men. And time." 
(Perrot, 1968:123). 
Summary and Conclusions 
A few summary considerations deserve t o  be  brought together. 
First, the da ta  upon which quantitative works a r e  based  p r e s e n t  shor tcomings  
t h a t  have  been shown t o  b ias  our  understmding of strikes. Errors in measurement 
(underreporting, etc.) ' 'distort relationships among variables. Moreover, official statistics 
f a i l  t o  provide information on strike techniques (walk-outs, sit-downs, checker-board, 
etc.), on other relevant features of strikes (demonstrations through the  shop, marches 
t o  c i t y  hall ,  etc.) ,  a n d  on t h e  broader spectrum of working class actions (such as 
slowdowns, work to the  rule, overtime ban, etc.). The lack of this type of data  has 
dangerously led t o  the 'tout court' identification of class conflict with just one of i ts  
manifestations-strikes. Explaining how and why workers  choose  among a l t e r n a t i v e s  
wi th  in t h e i r  r epe r  t o i r e  of actions is as interesting--and as important--as discerning 
how and why strike decisions a r e  taken. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  wha t  i s  t h e  d is t r ibu t ion  o f  
actions in this repertoire and how does i t  change over time? 
Second, t he  presence of methodological p rob lems  is l ikely t o  undermine  t h e  
e m p i r i c a l  b a s i s  of  m a n y  of  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  conclus ions  reached:  t h e  var ious  
standardizing procedures used t o  account for long-term structural changes in t he  labor 
force have led to  an unnecessary proliferation of strike indicators; further more, they 
have introduced artificial  correlations when e m p l o y m e n t  o r  unemployment  f i gu res  
appear among,  the  regressors; OLS techniques have been used to  est imate relationships 
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t h a t  a r e  likely t o  be affected by reciprocal causation, yielding est imates  affected by 
s imu l t aneous  equa t ion  bias;  model  m i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  f i n a l l y ,  h a s  h a d  s e r i o u s  
consequences on the est imates  obtained. 
T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  d a t a  and  methodologica l  sho r t comings  undermine  t h e  
empirical basis of much strike research, our confidence in s o m e  of t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
conclus ions  may b e  ve ry  much weakened. All too often such problems are at best 
simply acknowledged in statistical appendices wi thout  f u r t h e r  conce rn  of  "how t h e  
problems raised a f fec t  the conclusions reached" (Edwards, 1981:281). 
Theoretical weaknesses, though, do not only s tem f rom ques t ionable  empi r i ca l  
t es t ing .  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  works have also failed t o  incorporate economic and politicall- 
o rgan iza t iona l  models  and  mic ro  and  m a c r o  models  within unif ied t h e o r e t i c a l  
frameworks. Furthermore, attention has rarely been paid t o  the role of strategies on 
the  par t  of employers or the  state in  f o s t e r i n g  o r  damping labor  mi l i tancy ,  t hus  
f a i l i ng  t o  d e a l  with all parties involved (workers, employers and increasingly so the  
state). 
Four th ,  a set of issues h a s  emerged tha t  require further investigation, either 
because of neglect (e.g., strike waves, employers' behavior), or because of unresolved 
discrepancies. There is an increasing need for replication of previous work, with the 
aim of directly addressing discrepancies stemming from d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  leve l  of 
agg rega t ion ,  model specification or sample period. Furthermore, Edwards' systematic 
challenge of Shorter and Tilly's hypotheses indicates tha t  there  may be differences in 
n a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  of s t r i k e s  t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  eas i ly  explained in terms of current 
theories. In depth comparative research may help overcoming also such discrepancies. 
Final ly ,  ou r  discussion has shown tha t  exclusive reliance on official strike data  
n e g l e c t s  fundamen ta l  a s p e c t s  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y ,  such  as t h e  ro l e  of i n f o r m a l  
leadersh ip ,  t h e  d i a l e c t i c  be tween  workers and employers tha t  leads t o  strikes, the 
ways technologica l  change  may  l ead  t o  s o c i a l  un res t  th rough t h e  disrupt ion of  
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cus tomary  socia l  re la t ions  within t h e  plant.  Although these  processes a r e  well 
documented by c a s e  s tudies ,  by and large ,  quan t i t a t ive  analysis  has  fa i led  t o  
incorporate their findings. 
In conclusion, quantitative methods cannot tell the  whole story. They should be 
viewed as  one among a number of tools of inquiry. As Stearns put i t  "I have found it 
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  develop a sufficiently subt le  in te rp re t ive  f ramework relying on 
statistical materials alone; o the r  evidence,  derived from more  deta i led  study of 
individual s t r ikes ,  is essential, and while i t  is potentially quantifiable the practical 
difficulties are considerable" (Stearns, 1974:9). 
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(1) 
New b i l l s  a r e  p a s s e d  a n d  old ones revoked as a consequence of large-scale 
demonstrative strikes. Even governments fall on the  wake of labor l'politicalll strikes 
(e.g., see t h e  right-wing Tambroni  government  in I taly,  brought  down by labor 
disorders in Genoa). Clearly if information on this type of demonstrative, "political" 
s t r i k e  is  not  recorded,  t h e  short-run relat ionship between strikes and politics is 
missed. This does not exclude, however, the existence of a second, more  pervasive 
type of relationship between strikes and politics. This second type can be captured by 
the data even if large-scale demonstrative strikes are  not recorded,  e i t h e r  because  
they  do not  m e e t  t h e  defini t ional  c r i t e r i a  of the  collecting agencies, like in the 
Italian case, or because such strikes are not common labor tactics, like in the  United 
States. Democratic administrations in the U.S. and labor governments in England have 
been shown t o  be  positively related to  the frequency of strikes (see Ashenfelter and 
Johnson, 1969; Pencavel ,  1970). The shape  of s t r ikes  in Italy has been shown to 
change drastically during the years 'of the "historic compromise" strategy pursued by 
t h e  I tal ian Communist  P a r t y  a f t e r  1975 (see Franzosi, 1980). On the relationship 
between strikes and pol i t ics  see t h e  l a t e r  sec t ion  "Beyond Economic Models o f  
Strikes". 
(2) 
Korpi, for  instance,  a rgues  that British definitions leave out the great majority of 
strikes, indeed something of t h e  order  of 90% of a l l  s t r i k e  occur rences  (Korpi, 
1981 :75). 
(3) 
It should also be pointed out  that there may be intrinsic difficulties in reporting the 
number of workers involved. Depending upon their position in the production process, 
t h e  s t r ike  of key work groups may leave  idle many more workers than the ones 
actually on strike. Whether these workers not directly striking but not working either 
a r e  included in the statistics may again depend upon management's decision to  take 
all idle workers "off the  clock", as much a s  upon t h e  power rela,tionships exist ing 
within the  plant. Many of the arguments on the alleged cost of strikes are based on 
such extended concepts of workers1 involvement in strikes, directly and indirectly, on 
the  producer and consumer side; see for all Chamberlain and Metzger Schilling, 1954. 
(4) 
D a t a  col lec t ing  on t h e  p a r t  of highly t ra ined bureaucra t i c  technicians at the  
dependence of the Ministry of Labor appears  t o  minimize t h e s e  problems for  t h e  
French case  (see P e r r o t ,  1968). Sys temat ic  double-checking of information from 
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various sources, and accurate. scanning of local press can further reduce problems of 
under-reporting (for the  United States see Peterson, 1937: 170-2; see a l so  Edwards, 
1981). In my ,discussion, I have preferred to rely on the Italian example exclusively, in 
order to  be more specific about the ways definitions and collecting procedures may 
af fec t  our understanding of strikes. , 
(5) 
Turner  r epor t s  t h a t  in England in the  motor industry and coalmining approximately 
80% and 30% respectively of all work stop ages, as recorded by the firms themselves, 
never  make  in to  the  of f ic ia l  statistics P Turner, 1969). For the United States, Kuhn 
argues that  "short strikes are  much more likely t o  go unreported" and quotes  f rom 
t h e  U.S. Labor.  Depar tment  tha t  a change in the  collecting procedures in the mid- 
1950 increased the number of strikes by an estimated 5% (Kuhn, 1961:194; see a lso  
Edwards, 1981:306-13). On the basis of a sample survey among metalworking firms in 
Sweden, Korpi estimates an annual  ave rage  of  1.8 unreported s t r ikes  per 10,000 
workers,  and a f igure at l eas t  t h r e e  t imes  higher if all collective incidences are 
included, and not just strikes (Korpi, 1981:73). 
I t  should b e  noted, however, that from a purely methodological point of view 
the  discontinuities that  are introduced in a time series as a result of changes in the 
collecting procedures, definitions or other, may be less of a problem than systematic 
underestimation. Changes in the mean a t  given points in time can in f a c t  be  d e a l t  
with in the general linear model through covariance analysis (see Johnston, 1972:192- 
207) or in time series ARIMA models through intervention analysis (e.g., see Box and 
Tiao, 1975). Sys temat ic  bias, on the other hand, may be potentially a more serious 
problem, unless one could assume that  recording biases do not  change over t ime  (in 
which case -the Least Squares estimates of the coefficients would only differ by an 
unknown transformation constant). Such an assumption, however, is not likely t o  b e  
realistic in most cases and in strike statistics in particular. As we have seen, Korpi 
has shown that  the  frequency of short unofficial work stoppages, that  most often go 
unrecorded, varies overtime as  a result of both economic and political conditions.. 
The decision involved often being 'political' rather than merely technical (see Stearns, 
1974:9). 
(7) 
Again, too highly aggregated spatial data would make less firm any conclusion about 
the  ef fec t  of urbanization (see Stern, 1976; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Edwards, 1981). 
No less serious is the problem of data aggregation across industrial sectors. In fact,  
the  more highly aggregated the figures provided at the industry level,  t h e  less  one  
c a n  say  a b o u t  t h e  effect on s t r ike  ac t iv i ty  of t h e  level  of technology, t h e  
composition of the work force by sex and age, the  average plant size, the degree of 
monopolistic concentra t ion  in an industry,  t h e  skill  mix, etc. (see Shorey, 1975; 
Conell, 1980:112-57). This paper has primarily focused on t h e  temporal  a spec t s  of 
s t r i k e  ac t iv i ty ,  mostly because the distribution of quantitative strike research works 
themselves is highly skewed toward time series, rather than cross  sec t ional  issues. 
However, in particular in recent decades, a few studies have dealt with inter-regional 
and inter-industry propensities to  strike (see Knowles, 1952; Kerr and Siegel,  1954; 
Br i t t  and Galle, 1972; Shorter  and Tilly, 1974; Shorey, 1976; Stern, 1976; on the 
relationship between plant size and strike activity, see Cleland,  1955; Cass, 1957; 
Ingham, 1970; Shorey, 1975; Prais, 1978; Churnside and Creigh, 1981). 
(8) 
On t h e  shape of s t r ikes  see Shor ter  and Tilly, 1971, 1974; for  Italy, see also, 
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Bordogna and Provasi,  1979; Franzosi,  1980; t h e  United S t a t e s  seem t o  be an 
exception t o  international trends, see Edwards, 1981:23; on the  long-run processes that  
have affected the shape of strikes, see Shorter and Tilly, 1971, 1974; for the short- 
run aspects see also, Britt and Galle, 1974. 
(9) 
On t h e  trend of  strikes see Douglas, 1923; Douty, 1932; Gomberg, 1944; Jurkat and 
Jurkat, 1949; Turner, 1963; Goodman, 1967; Silver, 1973; Sapsf ord, 1975; Franzosi,  
1980. 
(10) 
For a ,  criticism of the "withering away of strikes" thesis, see Elridge, 1968:23-35 and 
Ingham, 1974:ll-23. 
(11) 
For  an example of t h e  use of volume, see Hibbs, 1976; for a critique, see Shalev, 
1978:482-3; Korpi and Shalev, 1979:186. 
(12) 
For a de ta i led  analysis  of t h e  immediate causes of strikes and the importance of 
wage issues, see Durand and Dubois, 1975; Durand, 1977; Edwards, 1981 :36-4 1. 
(13) 
For an account  of such 'employers' practices see Stearns, 1968; Della Rocca, 1976; 
Treu, 1976; Conell, 1980. 
(14) 
For a t t e m p t s  a t  quantifying employers' behavior through the number of layoffs and 
transfers in the context of econometric analysis, see Franzosi, 1981; for an example 
of how t o  cons t ruc t  quan t i t a t ive  indices of labor repression through labor court 
sentences, see Melucci and Rositi, 1975. 
(15) 
For a detailed account of the processes leading t o  a strike that never occurred, see 
Batstone et al., 1978. 
(16) 
Korpi e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  col lec t ive  actions which do not involve work stoppages (what 
Korpi calls collective demonstrations, such as slow-downs, overtime bans, etc.) a re  by 
f a r  more f r equen t  than work stoppages and much less likely t o  go beyond the 
fac to r i e s '  g a t e s  and come  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  press or even of unions o r  
employers organizations' headquarters. Their number is perhaps three times as  high as 
the number of unofficial strikes, as  recorded by the  firms themselves  orpi pi, 1981:72- 
5). 
(17) 
There  exis ts  an abundant production of empirical works focusing on the relationship 
between the business cyc le  and s t r ike  act ivi ty--frequency in par t icular .  Severa l  
d i f f e r e n t  economic indica tors  have been used as. measures of the cycle: price and 
wage indices, import values of raw materials, industrial production, composite cyclical 
indicators, and GNP. After World War 11, when reliable labor force survey data have 
become available, unemployment r a t e  has  been t h e  most commonly used cycl ica l  
indicator. 
For the United States, see Hansen, 1921; Griffin, 1939; Yoder, 1940; Jurkat and 
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Ju rka t ,  1949; Rees,  1952; O'Brien, 1965. Ashenfelter and Johnson's work (1969) has 1 
become a landmark in q u a n t i t a t i v e  s t r i k e  r e s e a r c h  d e a l i n g  w i t h  e c o n o m i c  
determinants. For more recent work, see Skeels, 1971; Snyder, 1975, 1977; Lipsky and 
Farber, 1976; Conell, 1980; Edwards, 1981. 
1 
For the  United Kingdom, s e e  Gomberg, 1944; Knowles, 1952; Pencavel, 1970; 
Bean and Peel, 1976; Shorey, 1976; Mayhew, 1979; Cronin, 1979. For a collection of 
quantitative works on U.K. strike activity, see Evans and Creigh, 1977. 
For Canada, see Vanderkamp, 1970; Smith,  1972; Walsh, 1975; Snyder, 1977; 1 
Cousineau and Lacroix, 1976; Smith, 1979. I 
For France ,  see Rist ,  1907, 1912; March, 1911, 1913. For a discussion of I 
subsequent French literature, see Bouvier, 1964. For l a t e r  works, see Goetz-Girey, 
1965; Andreani, 1968; Perrot,  1974; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Snyder, 1975. See also 
Perrot, 1968. I 
For Italy, see Snyder, 1975; Bordogna and Provasi, 1979; Franzosi, 1981, 1981b. I 





For a cr i t ique  of Snyder's work, see ,  Smith,  1979; Edwa.rds, 1981:52-4,67,79-81; I 
Franzosi, 198 1 :190-6. , 
(1 9) I 
For France ,  see P e r r o t ,  1974; Andreani, 1968; Goetz-Girey, 1965; for the United 
States see Snyder, 1975, 1977; for the United Kingdom see Cronin, 1979. 
1 
(20) 
Levitt's view has not gone uncriticized. First, his argument primarily deals with long- 
term movements of strikes (see Goldner, 1953). Levitt himself, in f ac t ,  concedes t o  
R e e s  t h a t  in t h e  shor t  period t h e  corre la t ion  between s t r ike  frequency and the 
business cycle  is posi t ive (Levi t t ,  1953b). In t h e  second place,  s t r ikes  in most  
countries a re  typically short, and therefore unlikely to  put workers in serious financial 
difficulties. In any case, it is  always possible fo r  workers on s t r ike  t o  postpone 
monthly installment payments or purchase subsistence goods on credit from local shop 
keepers (see Coldner,-,1953; Blitz, 1954; see also Lev i t t ,  1954). The e x t e n t  of t h e  
phenomenon of one  industry towns would also appear t o  have been exaggerated. In 
historical perspective, even broader issues raised by Levitt, such a s  increasing b i r th  
rates, have lost some of their relevance, reflecting a situation typical of the fifties, 
and disproved by later trends. 
(21) 
For a more systematic treatment of strike waves see Shorter and Tilly, 1973, 1974; 
see also, Cronin, 1979; Edwards, 1981. 
(22) 
On t h e  inadequacy of the political indicators commonly used in econometric works, 
see also Edwards, 1981:81. 
(23) 
There exists a vast literature on the subject; see for all Hines, 1964; Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel, 1969; Bain and Elsheik, 1976; Romagnoli and Rossi, 1980. For a survey, see 
Parsley, 1980. 
(24) 
This is particularly true for those countries, where collective bargaining is carried out 
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b o t h  a t  t h e  p l a n t  level ,  and a t  the  industry o r  even economy level  (on t h e  
relationship between barganing structure and strike activity, see Clegg, 1976). As a 
result, outliers in strike size could be less severe for the  United States, where plant 
level bargaining is predominant. Outliers for t h e  United S t a t e s  a r e  more likely t o  
occur  for  s t r i k e  duration. There, in fact,  much more so than anywhere else, strikes 
tend t o  be quite long (see Clegg, 1976; Edwards, 1981). 
(25) 
For an  introduction t o  spec t ra l  analysis, see Jenkins and Watts, 1968; for ARIMA 
models, see Box and Jenkins, 1976; for an application of spectral analysis using strike 
data, see Franzosi, 1980. 
(26) 
On over time aggregation see also, Moriguchi, 1970; Zellner and Montmarquette, 1971. 
(27) 
There  is 'yet another  way in which temporal  aggregat ion  may seriously a f f e c t  
empirical results. In the last decade, for instance, there has been much debate as . to 
whether  t r a d e  unions cause  inflation through collective bargaining. The question is 
whether trade union militancy, as measured by unionization and/or strike activity, can 
push  w a g e s  up i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of  labor marke t  conditions. What compara t ive  
econometr ic  work has fai led to  recognize is t h a t  over t i m e  a g g r e g a t i o n  h a s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  the i r  answer t o  th is  question. In f a c t ,  when col lec t ive  
agreements are  signed at year  end, wage inc reases  will be  e f f e c t i v e  as of t h e  
b e g i ~ i n g  of the following year. Strike activity, though, would have occurred prior to 
the signing of the agreement. Using yearly data, a lagged relationship would have t o  
b e  specified. But  at o the r  t imes,  for those cases where collective agreements are 
renewed at mid year, s t r ike  ac t iv i ty  and wage increases  f a l l  in t h e  s a m e  year ,  
t h e r e f o r e  making the relationship contemporaneous. As a consequence of aggregation 
problems, the sign of the relationship is  thus  highly dependent  upon t h e  type  o f  
specification adopted--contemporaneous or lagged. Furthermore, in these cases, where 
relatively short series are  used (usually 20 t o  25 years for the  postwar period) and 
where the effective number of observations may be further reduced by the fac t  that 
collective agreements usually last between two t o  three years, an outlier can make a 
significant difference, tilting the relationship one way or the other (for the problems 
involved in e s t ima t ing  wa e determinat ion  models  fo r  t h e  Italian case ,  see d e  
Caprariis and Franzosi, 19818. 
(28) 
For a list of which measures have been used by which scholars, see stern, 1978. 
(29) 
For the use of such variables, see Vanderkamp, 1970; Snyder, 1975. 
(30) 
For a similar  consideration in relation to Snyder's failure to  justify results that run 
counter prevailing findings and to confront the discrepancy, see Smith, 1979. 
(31) 
Even par t ia l ly  accep t ing  Durand's critique, in my opinion, having isolated a set of 
social, political and economic variables related to  strikes is in itself no little result. 
The issue, though, i s  more than just academic ,  a s  i t  c a n  have both ideological 
relevance and policy implications. Claiming, for instance, t h a t  labor militancy is  a 
cause of inflation, on the basis of regression results, means assuming a causality that 
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runs f rom s t r ike  activity t o  the rate of change of money wages. As we have seen, 
though, econometric models have just as successfully reversed the causal order. Since 
economet r i c  resul t s  o f t en  have policy implications with ideological overtones, too 
narrowly focused empir ica l  invest igat ions may be  not  simply f a u l t y  b u t  e v e n  
dangerous. 
(32) 
Indeed, at the lowest level of analysis very lit t le is known about people's reasons for 
joining social movements. Olson has argued t h a t ,  unless d i f f e ren t i a l  rewards and 
sanctions to particular individuals a re  applied, i t  would actually run counter individual 
self-interest t o  apply resources in the group's interest, in particular for large, latent 
groups (see Olson, 1965). Groups, however, d o  fo rm and individuals do ingage in 
collective actions (see Smith, 19741, although at the present  s t a t e  of t h e  a r t  very 
little is known about the individual level mechanisms that lead to such processes. 
(33) 
Excep t  f o r  early periods when information on individual Strikes were provided. As a 
result, research works that  have analyzed last century  d a t a  have been much more 
specific and insightful than works based on recent, highly aggregated data (see Perrot, 
1974; Conell, 1980). 
(34) 
The case study literature is enormous. For some examples, see Warner and Low, 1947; 
Gouldner, 1954; Turner, Clack and Roberts, 1967; Elridge, 1968; Batstone et al., 1978. 
(35) 
Recent ly ,  t h e r e  have appeared invest igat ions that  combined the micro and macro 
approaches in quantitative-although non-econometric--analyses of large samples  o f  
individual s t r ikes  and theil; cha rac te r i s  tics (see Durand and Dubois, 1975; Durand, 
1977). Such works are attempts a t  retaining much of t h e  micro-level information 
a v a i l a b l e  in c a s e  studies,  and a t  the  s a m e  t i m e  achieving the  genera l i ty  and 
representativeness of quantitative studies. While the  main emphasis  of quan t i t a t ive  
s tudies  based on official data is usually longitudinal, works based on sample surveys 
are  almost of necessity cross-sectional, given t h e  in t r ins ic  d i f f icul t ies  involved in 
collecting a large sample of strikes over time. 
As a consequence, the issues addressed a re  different. Studies based on o f f i c i a l  
t i m e - s e r i e s  d a t a  dea l  with t h e  t empora l  components  of strikes--trend, cycle,  
seasonality--and their determinants, while cross-section works primarily focus on intra- 
and in te  r-plant characteris t ics  with no time dimension (if one excludes comparisons 
between few points in .time when previous surveys happen t o  be available; see Durand 
and Dubois, 1975; Durand, 1977). To the extent that  strike activity shows significant 
d i f f e rences  over t ime ,  one diff icul ty r e sea rch  works based on sample  s u r v e y s  
encounter is that it  is hard to generalize their findings over time. 
Additional problems arise if the survey is taken f rom a sample  of s t r ikes  o r  
p lants  across  severa l  industr ial  sec to r s  in countries where collective bargaining is 
characterized by both industry and plant level bargaining (see Clegg, 1976; Franzosi, 
1981, 1981b). The level of mobilization in each sector may in fac t  differ primarily a s  
a consequence of the particular bargaining situation of a sector or plant at the time 
of t h e  survey. Although, ideally, one would l ike t o  see  both levels  of analysis 
performed within the same work, the data collecting task confronting such a research 
design is enormous. 
(36) 
For an answer t o  t h e  phenomenological c r i t ique ,  a t  least  for quantitative strike 
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research, see Edwards, 1981:284-91; see also McCarthy, 1959. 
(37) 
In expressions of the  type,  "We would have  liked t o  submit  th is  hypothesis to  
empirical testing. Unfortunately the d a t a  were  not  available." o r  "The s t a t i s t i c a l  
techniques  did not  allow us t o  test th is  hypothesis more satisfactorily." And the 
problems thus get pushed aside. 
(38) 
The distr ibution of strikes by their immediate cause, in terms of the reasons given 
for striking, i.e., expressed de.mands, has long been available for most countr ies .  On 
t h e  basis of such f igures,  analyses of strikers' demands have been conducted (see 
Knowles, 1952; McCarthy, 1954; Edwards, 1981). However, given that  only a handful 
of categories of causes are  usually reported, the information provided are  necessarily 
limited. As a consequence only gross generalizations about the over time distribution 
of  strikes by cause, and their meaning, in terms of working class changing strategies 
in t h e  f a c e  of changing ident i f iable  e x t e r n a l  conditions, c a n  be  af forded ( see  
McCarthy, 1954). 
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